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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPER COR-
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vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The statement of fact is adequately set forth in the 
stipulated findings of the lower court. (R2-10) Plaintiff 
has set forth most of these findings in its brief, therefore 
further elucidation is unnecessary. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The assessments here in question were not made 
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. 
2. The valuation of the lands here in question was 
made in accordance with the statutory mandates. 
Case No. 
7639 
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3. The lands here in question do not come within 
that portion of Section 80-5-56, U. C. A., 1943, as 
amended, which provides: 
"All metalliferous mines and mining claims, 
both placer and rock in place, shall be assessed 
at $5 per acre and in addition thereto at a value 
equal to two times the net annual proceeds there-
of for the calendar year next preceding." 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ASSESSMENTS HERE IN QUESTION WERE NOT 
MADE IN AN ARBITRARY AND DISCRIMINATORY MAN-
NER. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that plain-
tiff has been treated in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
manner. The fundamental standards followed by the 
commission in assessing the lands of the smallest tax-
payer within its jurisdiction have been adhered to in 
assessing the lands of the Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion. True, the Kennecott Copper Corporation stands 
in a unique position because of the magnitude of its oper-
ation. Its production and industry can be pointed to with 
pride by the people of the state. If the assessments here 
in question are wrong, the commission stands ready to 
correct them. 
Plaintiff stresses the point that lands owned by 
others in the vicinity of plaintiff's mill site and tailings 
pond are assessed from $4.14 per acre to $66.16 per acre. 
(E-12) Certainly there can be no discrimination here be-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cause plaintiff's lands are now assessed at $45.73 per 
acre. 
The assessment* of plaintiff's lands were protested 
to the commission. The commission considered the matter 
and determined that in its opinion $45.73 per acre was 
fair. (R-95) Plaintiff attempts to make much of the fact 
that the figure of $45.73 per acre is not the personal 
valuation of Mr. Higgs, an employee of the property tax 
department of the Tax Commission. (R-56) The assess-
ment of lands are made by the Tax Commission. (R23-24) 
Plaintiff cannot contend that Commissioner Hammond, 
who has been a member of the commission since 1931 and 
in charge of ad valorem property taxation, is not at least 
as qualified to pass on the validity of an assessment as 
one of the commission's employees. (R80-49) 
Commissioner Hammond testified that in his opinion 
the assessment was fair. (R-95) Mr. Higgs testified that 
he reported the lands in question to the commission as a 
unit in the entire operation of plaintiff in connection with 
net proceeds. (R-57) Plaintiff's statement on page 16 
of its brief would leave us to believe that these lands 
were reported to the commission to be assessed as "mines 
or mining claims," within the meaning of 80-5-56, U. C. A., 
1943, as amended. This is entirely false. Furthermore, 
it was stipulated by the parties hereto in the findings of 
the lower court (R-8) that: 
"The only instance which has come to the at-
tention of the commission wherein a dump is lo-
cated on other than a mining claim, patented or 
unpatented, is the Kennecott Copper Dump as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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outlined on Exhibit A. All other dumps being lo-
cated on a mining claim, patented or unpatented, 
have been assessed at $5.00 per acre. * # *" 
In 1947 the legislature changed the assessment of 
property from "full cash value" to "40%" thereof. (80-
5-56 U.C.A. 1943, as amended) In order that the court 
will understand why the figure of $45.73 per acre re-
mained constant at this time, except for blanket changes, 
a portion of the testimony of Commissioner Hammond 
is quoted: (E93-94) 
"A. During the period of the war, there was 
violent fluctuations in values, in market 
values, and in the values based on the use to 
which land could be put. We called the matter 
to the attention of the Legislature, and pre-
sented this issue to them. We said land 
values and other values are rapidly rising, 
and they are rising in erratic ways, in such 
a manner that it is very difficult to tell just 
what property is truly worth. Some proper-
ties are sold at very high values; others not 
quite so high, even where the properties were 
the same; so there was confusion in values, 
in market values along that time. We were 
reluctant to move the values up on the basis 
of this confused situation, and we presented 
the matter to the Legislature. We told them 
that there are at least two things involved: 
One of them, as to whether they wished 
to control levies, or rather control public 
expenditures through levies. We explained 
that, if we should follow the market on values, 
that, in effect, that would take away the 
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practical control that was then in operation 
through these levy laws, and we suggested 
that one or two things—one of two th ings -
be done; either that the levies be changed so 
as to exercise a practical control over a vastly-
increased assessed valuation, or that the law 
be enacted which would change the base of 
valuation in such a way that these levies still 
would be in practical control. 
A good deal of discussion was had at that 
time. It was thought that property was then 
assessed at about forty per cent of its current 
value. The Legislature took the course of— 
determined that the value should be forty 
per cent of what was called its reasonable 
fair cash value; so that, for the most part, 
values were not changed when this law became 
effective, although we had been making 
studies which indicated, in some areas, that 
the values were certainly less than forty per 
cent, and, through a re-assessment procedure, 
in a number of counties, the assessments were 
changed. 
Q. Now, this $45.73 per acre valuation, the Com-
mission went into that matter, they studied 
it various times and their determination, after 
reasonable study of it, was that the land was 
worth $45.73 an acre, is that not correct? 
A. Yes, sir, that is correct." 
II. 
THE VALUATION OF THE LANDS HERE IN QUES-
TION WAS MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATU-
TORY MANDATES. 
Under the provisions of 80-5-56, U.C.A., 1943, as 
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amended, the legislature has provided that property 
other than mines or mining claims shall be assessed at 
forty per cent of its "reasonable fair cash value." 
Section 80-3-1 (5) U.C.A., 1943, provides: 
" 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the 
amount at which the property would be taken in 
payment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor." 
It is general law that these provisions pertaining 
to valuation of property are set up as guides or stand-
ards by the legislature to aid the taxing body in arriv-
ing at a valuation. These factors all resolve themselves 
into one element which comprises enumerable factors, 
conditions and circumstances and changes, which element 
is commonly denominated "market value" See Con-
tinental National Bank vs. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 63, 64; 179 
Pac. 67; See also the text State and Local Taxation of 
Property by National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., 
1930. At Page 16 it is stated: 
"As a general rule, however, the legislatures 
have stopped with the definition of taxable value, 
frequently modified by the statements that the 
value is to be that amount which would be paid 
for the property 'by a willing buyer to a willing 
seller,' or that amount which would be expected 
in the 'settlement of a just debt from a solvent 
debtor;' that the value must be that which the 
seller would ordinarily receive at a voluntary, 
rather than a forced sale; or that the value must 
be that obtained in a 'fair, free and well-adver-
tised market.' 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
"A perusal of these statutory provisions leads 
to the conclusion that there is nothing unusual or 
obscure about the meaning of taxable value. Value 
means to the legislator approximately the same 
thing that it means to the economist, although 
the two define it in different ways. Taxable value 
means selling or market value. It does not mean 
necessarily the capitalization of income yield or 
potential income yield; nor does it mean neces-
sarily the price actually received for any piece 
of property at any particular sale. Taxable value 
is a norm. It is the price that property might 
reasonably be expected to bring in a normal 
market * * *" 
The plaintiff stresses the fact that the commission 
in assessing these properties, took into consideration the 
use to which the properties would be subjected. Plaintiff 
asserts that if this element is injected into the picture 
"the lid is off in that forty per cent of the amount at 
which the property would be taken in payment of a just 
debt due from a solvent debtor no longer applies." (PL 
Brief, 21, 22) No such statement was admitted by defend-
ants or intervenors or byMr. Hammond who testified for 
the commission. (R-88) The commission took into con-
sideration this element of use and arrived at the assessed 
valuation of $45.73 per acre. It did not arrive at any 
"astronomical" figure. As Mr. Hammond testified, the 
valuation of the properties in question was a very diffi-
cult determination to make, but upon considering the 
facts and all the circumstances, the commission arrived 
at the value of $45.73 per acre. This difficulty of valu-
ation stresses the very essence of that general doctrine 
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in the law which is: that a court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of a taxing body unless it can be deter-
mined that fraud or malice was present in making the 
assessment. 
See Home Fire Insurance Company v. Salt Lake 
County, 19 Utah 189, 194, 195, 56 P 681, 682; Also First 
National Bank of Nephi v. Christensen, 39 Utah 568, 578, 
579,118 P 778, 781. 
"In such case, those whose property was in-
tentionally assessed at a higher percentage or 
valuation than was placed on the general mass of 
taxable properly in the county may invoke the 
aid of courts to compel the taxing officers to re-
duce the excessive assessment so made, to the same 
proportion of value as was placed upon the gen-
eral mass of other taxable property in the county. 
A denial of such right results in inequality and a 
want of uniformity in the assessment and taxa-
tion. 
"The burden to show the inequality was on 
the plaintiff. 
«* * # Of
 c o u r s e ? specific instances here and 
there where a lower valuation in proportion to 
the actual or cash value was placed on taxable 
property than was placed on plaintiff's property 
do not, within themselves, furnish sufficient 
ground for complaint. To constitute such ground, 
it must be made to appear that a greater valu-
ation in proportion to the actual or cash value was 
placed on plaintiff's property than was placed on 
the )general mass of taxable property in the 
county * * *" 
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See also Continental National Bank of Salt Lake 
City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 69,179 P 67, 75. 
"Even if we could find that there was some 
apparent discrimination in point of fact by which 
appellant and other banks and their stockholders 
were required to pay something more than was re-
quired of taxpayers on some other classes of prop-
erty, still, as we understand the authorities, appel-
lant would have no standing in a court of equity 
to restrain the collection of the tax unless the dis-
crimination resulted from wrong principles, 
methods, or standards, willfully and intentionally 
adopted. Discriminations resulting from mistake, 
inadvertence, and miscalculations or error of 
judgment must be remedied in some other form of 
proceeding than the one adopted by appellant in 
the case at bar." 
See also Nutter v. Carbon County, 58 Utah 1,11,196 
P 1009, 1013; also Pingree National Bank of Og&en, 54 
Utah 599,183 P 334. 
In order that the court can understand the diffi-
culties in the valuation of land of this type, portions of 
the testimony of Commissioner Hammond are inserted. 
(E82-83-84-85) 
"Q. Mr. Hammond, I appreciate that I'm trying 
to be perhaps too informal on this thing, but 
I am trying to do it in the interest of fair-
ness. Now you've had these questions in mind, 
and you have discussed the answers, and you 
have heard Mr. Collins' answers. Now, if 
you disagree, I want to give you full oppor-
tunity to state just wherein you disagree and 
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the reasons that you might care to give, so 
that the Court can be fully informed of the 
Tax Commission's position. 
A. I disagree in this particular: Land has value 
according to the highest or the best use to 
which it can be put. This land, in my opinion, 
has had its— 
Q. Which land? 
A. The land in the, under the tailings dump, in 
my opinion, has had its value, for the pur-
pose for which it was previously used, com-
pletely destroyed, at least for all present 
considerations, but there has been a value 
created there for the purpose to which it is 
being, now being put, namely, for a tailings 
pond. It is particularly advantageous to the 
mining company in question to have land 
available close to its operations, and at an 
altitude from which, or at an altitude which 
makes it easy to get the tailings on to it, so 
that I think that the value of this land must 
be considered on the basis of the use to which 
it can be put in this particular case by Kenne-
cott Copper Company. 
Q. Then, you agree with Mr. Collins that, if the 
test or basis of assessment is to be forty per 
cent of its reasonable fair cash value in the 
sense that it would be accepted by a creditor 
from a solvent debtor in payment of a debt, 
that it would have no, or a nominal value in 
that sense? 
A. No, I do not. I would like to explain my posi-
tion there. Of course, we are getting into 
some hypothetical situations— 
Q. Oh, yes. 
A. —but consider the land as it is, suppose—and 
as it is now being used—suppose that some-
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one owned that land and could turn the land 
over to a person to whom he owed some 
money, and that that land is still needed by 
Kennecott Copper, I would say that the land 
under those conditions has a great deal of 
value. 
Q. Yes; but, apart from its present use by Ken-
necott or a successor, do you agree that the 
land would not have any value, or at least a 
nominal value? 
A. Yes, if Kennecott were abandoned, if there 
were no such use for this land, I would say 
that its value certainly was questionable, and 
might be in a negative sum. 
Q. Yes; now, measured by its value to Kennecott 
or a successor and its present use, I think, 
in your honest opinion, you feel that the fig-
ure of $45.73 is the result of the exercise of 
an honest judgment, is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. But, by the same token, do you disagree with 
Mr. Collins' opinion that you might just as 
well have assessed the land on that measure 
of value at $4,573 per acre ? 
A. I would disagree with him as far as such an 
assessment is concerned. 
Q. What would be your standard of value, apart 
from a judgment figure, in the sense that 
someone pulled out or wrote down $45.73? 
A. In the first place, I'd say that the bottom 
price—the bottom value—of this land is its 
value as it was prior to the time it was used 
for a tailings dump. 
Q. That has been destroyed, has it not? 
A. That's true, but that would come into the con-
sideration, for this reason, in the use—in the 
other use to which the land is being put, 
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surely it would be worth at least as much as 
it cost, or it wouldn't be put to this other use. 
Q. All right, using that as a starting point, what 
else would you do, or did you do ? 
A. Then, of course, the problem is if we should 
assume that that is the floor, in a considera-
• tion of this value, the next point would be, 
what would be the top value by which the land 
could be considered to be worth, and there we 
would get into a field of possibly astronomical 
figures, but, in the consideration of this, we 
certainly did not weigh the value of the land 
that might—well, the value that Kennecott 
might be compelled to pay in case, in case 
the title to the land suddenly were declared 
in someone else, and in case they had to buy 
the land for their own use. We would not 
consider that that top figure would be a sound 
basis for valuing the land; in other words, 
we wouldn't say that the forced value—the 
value that would be forced upon a company 
in order to get it would be a sound basis for 
value. 
Q. That is these astronomical figures ? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. So, you strike a figure somewhere in between, 
is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And that figure, is it not fair to say, was 
purely an arbitrary one that—having to as-
sign a figure somewhere in between those 
selected? 
A. No, it wasn't an arbitrary one, but it was a 
difficult one to figure. It was a difficult one 
to reach. 
Q. And could it not just as well have been $475 
per acre ? 
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A. If we had gone that high in the assessed 
value, I would say that we were putting a 
weight to a figure, a forced figure, that the 
company might be required to pay, and I 
recognize that a company might be required 
to pay a most unreasonable figure, under cer-
tain circumstances." 
Plaintiff's contention that a taxing body cannot look 
to the factor of "use" to which property is put to deter-
mine a market value or the assessment of said property 
is entirely without merit. As Commissioner Hammond 
testified, the use to which land may be put is an im-
portant factor in their assessment. 
Plaintiff at pages 19, 20 and 21 of its brief sets 
forth a portion of the testimony of Mr. Collins, Avhom 
plaintiff considers an expert in valuing mines and min-
ing property. However, Mr. Collins specifically testified 
that in the course of his work at Tracy-Collins Trust 
Company they never made loans on mines or mining 
claims, that they did not engage in that type of business 
and, therefore, were never called upon to make appraisals 
of mines or mining property. (R-78) 
In the case of Susquehanna Power Company v. State 
Tax Commission of Maryland, 283 U.S. 291, 295, 296, 
51 Sup. Ct. 434, 436, 75 L. Ed. 1024, 1046, 1047; this 
question concerning the use to which property is put in 
determining valuation was discussed by the Court. The 
Susquehanna Power Company had purchased large tracts 
of land from private individuals, and also had been 
granted considerable land by the state to construct a dam 
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in a navigable river. This right of construction was 
granted by license from the United States Government. 
Upon completion of the dam, the lands in the bed of the 
Susquehanna Kiver, and in addition the surrounding 
lands which had been purchased and granted to the com-
pany, were covered by the waters of the dam. The State 
Tax Commission of Maryland assessed these lands which 
were covered by the waters of the dam at a higher rate 
than the surrounding land. The company had objected 
upon the grounds that the Tax Commission was taking 
into consideration the value of the license granted by the 
Federal Government. The court, however, dismissed this 
as without merit and held that the taxation of said lands 
was constitutional and within the law. The court stated 
in the course of its opinion the following: 
"No basis is laid in the present record for 
assailing the tax on constitutional grounds, either 
because the commission has placed a higher value 
on appellant's lands than on others having a simi-
lar location and use, or because it has directly 
taxed appellant's license. The contention urged is 
that the lands are assessed at a higher value than 
they were before they were submerged, and higher 
than farm uplands in the neighborhood, and that 
since their use as a part of appellant's power proj-
ect is rendered possible only by the federal li-
cense and by the water in the river, the assessment 
at the higher value, in effect, involves a forbidden 
tax on the license, and taxation of appellant for 
the value of the waters of a navigable stream. 
"Accepting as we must on this record, the 
valuation of the commission as neither excessive 
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nor discriminatory, we can perceive no basis, 
either legal or economic, for relieving appellant 
from the burden of the tax by attempting the 
segregation of a part of that value and attributing 
it to independent legal interests, not subject to 
taxation, because those interests have a favorable 
influence on the value of the property. 
"An important element in the value of land is 
the use to which it may be put. That many vary 
with its location and its relationship to the prop-
erty or legal interests or others. See Willipis-
cogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Gilford 
64 N.H. 337, 10 Atl. 849. I ts proximity to means 
of transportation, highways, railroads or tide-
water (see State, New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 
Prosecutor, v. Yard, 43 N.J.L. 632; State, Trask, 
Prosecutor v. Carragan, 37 N.J.L. 264; cf. Hersey 
v. Barron County, 37 Wis. 75) or its location in 
the vicinity of water power belonging to another 
but available for use upon it (State v. Flavell, 24 
N.J.L. 370) may increase its utility and hence its 
taxable value. A dock on New York harbor may 
have a greater value than one on non-navigable 
waters (cf. Leary v. Jersey City 248 U.S. 328, 63 
L. Ed. 271, 39 S. Ct. 115, supra; Central R. Co. v. 
Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473, 52 L. Ed. 896; 28 S. Ct. 
592, supra) even though the advantages of the 
former may be terminated through the exercise of 
the superior power of the federal government 
over navigable waters (see United States v. 
Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. 229 U.S. 53, 
57 L .Ed . 1063, 33 S. Ct.667)." 
"A large part of the value of property in 
civilized communities has been built up by its in-
terrelated uses; but it is a value ultimately re-
fleeted in earning capacity and the price at which 
the property may be sold, and hence is an element 
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to which weight may appropriately be given in 
determining its taxable value. It has never been 
thought that the taxation of such property at its 
enhanced value is in effect taxation of its owner 
for the property of others. Nor can we say that 
the present tax, based upon what must be taken 
to be the fair value of appellant's lands profit-
able used in the business of developing and selling 
power, is forbidden because that use would not 
have been possible without the control which ap-
pellant has acquired over navigable waters 
through the grant of its license. Those considera-
tions which lead to the recognition of the power 
of a state to tax the property used by the grantee 
in the enjoyment of a federal license require 
recognition of the power to tax it on the basis 
of accepted standards of value, customarily ap-
plied in the taxation of other forms of property. 
See Union P. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 34-37, 
21 L. Ed. 787, 792-794, supra. 
III. 
THE LANDS HERE IN QUESTION DO NOT COME 
WITHIN THAT PORTION OF SECTION 80-5-56, U.C.A., 1943, 
AS AMENDED WHICH PROVIDES: 
"ALL METALLIFEROUS MINES AND MINING 
CLAIMS, BOTH PLACER AND ROCK IN PLACE, 
SHALL BE ASSESSED AT $5 PER ACRE AND IN 
ADDITION THERETO AT A VALUE EQUAL TO 
TWO TIMES THE NET ANNUAL PROCEEDS 
THEREOF FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR NEXT 
PRECEDING." 
Plaintiff, in its brief, attempts to bring these lands 
within the meaning of this statute by construing them to 
be a "part" of plaintiff's mine. The above-quoted provi-
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sion is clear and unambiguous, and the terms referred 
to are mines and mining claims, and these properties have 
never been reported as a mine or mining claim by plain-
tiff or its predecessors in interest. (E-8) The most that 
can be said is that these properties constitute a "part of 
plaintiff's mining operation." 
The reason for the enactment of such a statute as 
this is to overcome the difficulties in valuing a mine. 
Since it cannot be determined, with any degree of cer-
tainty, the value of the ore body beneath the surface of 
the ground, the legislature had to enact some provision 
which would place a reasonable value on that ore body. 
The result was this provision embodied in Section 80-5-56, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which provides a flat $5 per 
acre assessment, plus two times the net annual proceeds. 
Thus, we see that the reason for this rule of valuation 
is a matter of necessity and it, therefore, should not be 
extended to include cases clearly not within reason for 
the rule. 
In other words, if by visual examination of a piece 
of property a value can be placed thereon, and there are 
no hidden values such as would be found in an ore body 
hundreds of feet below the surface of the ground, the 
reason for the rule does not exist. 
In the case of South Utah Mines and Smelter v. 
Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325-332, 43 Su. Ct. 577, 67 L. 
Ed. 1004-1008, the court stated: 
"The rule prescribed for the valuation of 
metalliferous mines, as we have already indicated, 
is one of necessity, and should not be extended 
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to cases clearly not within the reason of the rule. 
The tailings severed and removed from the mine 
claims changed in character, placed on other and 
separate lands,, and having an adjudicated value 
of their own, in our opinion constituted a unit of 
property entirely apart from the mine from which 
they had been taken. See Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 
762-765, 24 L. Ed. 313-314,14 Mor. Min. Eep. 183. 
We think the agreement with the leasing company 
was not a sale of these tailings, but that the owner-
ship, pending the process of reduction, remained 
in the plaintiff. The plaintiff, therefore, was sub-
ject to taxation upon their value, but not as a 
mine, since that implies something capable of be-
ing mined, which this loose and homogeneous de-
posit obviously was not" 
It can be seen from the opinion in the above-quoted 
case that the reason for the rule does not apply in the 
present instance, and furthermore, the court, in its opin-
ion, unequivocably states that a tailings dump is not a 
mine. 
The properties in question have been assessed by 
the State Tax Commission, and taxes collected thereon 
under that portion of section 80-5-56, U.C.A., 1943, as 
amended, which provides: 
"All property * * * appurtenant to mines or 
mining claims * * * shall be assessed at 40% of 
their reasonable fair cash value." 
The record shows that these properties have been 
assessed by the State Tax Commission and its predeces-
sors, the State Board of Equalization, by authority of 
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this provision of the statute, for the 30 years last past. 
(R-7) The legislature has amended said provisions of the 
law a number of times, the most recent change being 
made by the 1949 Legislature, and it has never indicated 
its disapproval of the manner in which the Tax Commis-
sion has made this assessment, or that the Tax Commis-
sion was making the assessment without authority of 
law. Upon this basis, it is generally agreed by the author-
ities in the United States, and by this Court, that the 
legislature is presumed to have agreed with said con-
struction, and that it is a clear exposition of the law, as 
they intended it. See Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 107 Utah 24,151 P. 2d 467,153 A.L.K. 1176; 
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
107 Utah 155, 152 Pac. 2d 542; E. C. Olsen Co. v. State 
Tax Commission of Utah9 168 Pac. 2d 324; State Board 
of Land Commission v. Birie, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59. 
In the case of Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Cop-
per Corporation, 163 Fed. 2d 484, 489, a decision rendered 
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1947, except 
for intervenor, the identical parties now before this court 
were before the Federal Court. The identical issue of 
whether or not the lands upon which plaintiff's tailings 
dump and mills are located should be assessed by the 
State Tax Commission at $5.00 per acre, plus two times 
the net annual proceeds from the mine, or whether said 
lands should be assessed as ordinary land, was decided 
adversely to plaintiff. The only difference being in the 
nature of proof and that in the Federal case the taxes 
sought to be recovered were for the year 1944. (R-9-10) 
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The Circuit Court upheld the construction which had been 
placed upon this provision of the law by the taxing 
authority and did so on the basis of an approved admini-
strative construction. 
It is the contention of the commission that plaintiff 
is bound by this decision and cannot re-litigate this ques-
tion at this time. That aspect of the doctrine of Kes 
Judicata, commonly referred to as Collateral-Estoppel 
by judgment is applicable to the present situation. 
The United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S. Ct. 115, 92 
L. Ed. 898, gives a very fine exposition of this doctrine. 
Under the rule of Res Judicata, when a court, of com-
petent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the 
merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit are 
thereafter bound, not only as to every matter which was 
offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or 
demand, but also as to any other admissible matter which 
might have been offered for that purpose. In a tax 
proceeding involving a different cause or demand be-
cause of a different tax year in question, this doctrine 
of Collateral-Estoppel is applied. It is in this respect 
that where a second action between the same parties is 
upon a different cause or demand, the judgment in the 
prior action operates as an estoppel, not as to matters 
which might have been litigated and determined, but 
only as to those matters in issue or points controverted 
upon the determination of which the finding or verdict 
was rendered. (See, Restatement, Judgments §§ 68, 69, 
70) 
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The plaintiff in attempting to define the term "mine" 
so as to bring the properties in question within the mean-
ing of that term, cites from the case of Nephi Plaster 
and Manufacturing Co. v. Juab, 33 Utah 113, 93 Pac. 53 
(1907). The question in this case is whether a gypsum 
deposit, which, being mined, comes within the provisions 
of the statute taxing mines and mining claims. The court 
held that gypsum is a mineral, and the deposit which was 
laid down in the earth, and which was being mined, was 
a mine. Certainly, it cannot be claimed that plaintiff's 
tailings dump is a mine within the meaning of that term 
as used in this case. Plaintiff attempts to effect an ex-
tension of that term by citing but a phrase from the 
court's opinion. The result is entirely illogical. 
Further, plaintiff cites the case of Ontario Silver 
Mining Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 359, 164 Pac. 498. The 
constitutional provision and the law upon which this case 
was decided, have since been changed in their entirety. 
The particular reference made to that portion of the law 
pertaining to property "having a value separate and 
independent from such mine or mining claim" is no 
longer contained in the law or the Utah Constitution. 
Formerly a mine was taxed on the basis paid to the 
United States Government for the mine. There is nothing 
in the present law which harks back to this principle. 
The Supreme Court in the Ontario case, based its deci-
sion on that portion of the old law pertaining to whether 
or not the property had a separate and independent 
value. The court found that the drain tunnels did not 
have a separate and independent value from the mine; 
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hence, they were not assessable separately from the mine. 
There is no analogy between this action and the present 
provision of the Utah law. By no stretch of the imagina-
tion could such a construction be made. Furthermore, 
in the Hixon case, the land at and surrounding the portals 
of said tunnels and through which they were constructed 
throughout their entire length, consisted of mining 
claims and grounds for which the United States has 
issued mineral patents as such. 
Plaintiff quotes from Justice Wolfe's opinion in the 
recent case of Telonis v. Staley, et al, 104 Utah 505, 106 
Pac. 2d 163, to further sustain its position. The conten-
tion was made in this case that if the surface rights to 
property were separately assessed from the underlying 
mineral rights, then also under a tax sale, the two estates 
should be sold separately. The majority opinion, and 
also Justice Wolfe in dissenting, agreed that where the 
two estates were owned by one person, then the aggre-
gate of taxes on all interests of the owner could be sold 
together, and this would give a valid tax title. That is 
what Justice Wolfe's phrase means and it has no bear-
ing on the present question before this court. Plaintiff's 
attempt to construe this isolated phase to support its con-
tention that the tailings dump and mill site lands should 
be assessed at $5 per acre, plus a multiple of the net pro-
ceeds, the same as a mine or mining claim, is without logic 
and reason. The meaning of the court is plain and un-
ambiguous, and it does not refer to the point now in 
litigation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to show that the assessments here 
in question were made in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
manner. Further, the statutory requirements in assess-
ing the lands in question have been adhered to without 
question. Plaintiff's last proposition that the mill site 
lands and tailings pond lands should be assessed at $5 
an acre, etc., because they are "a part of the mine" dis-
regards the express and unambiguous language of the 
statute. 
This court has recently passed upon a question in-
volving the use of these words in the case of Crystal Lime 
and Cement Co. v. Bobbins, et al, Ut , 209 Pac. 
2d 739. It is unnecessary to quote portions of that opin-
ion, however, it is clear that the term "mine and mining 
claims" could never be construed to include land or 
property which may be "a part of the mine." 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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County Attorney 
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